We analyze the security and the efficiency of interactive protocols where a client wants to delegate the computation of an RSA signature given a public key, a public message and the secret signing exponent. We consider several protocols where the secret exponent is splitted using some algebraic decomposition. We first provide an exhaustive analysis of the delegation protocols in which the client outsources a single RSA exponentiation to the server. We then revisit the security of the protocols RSA-S1 and RSA-S2 that were proposed by Matsumoto, Kato and Imai in 1988. We present an improved lattice-based attack on RSA-S1 and we propose a simple variant of this protocol that provides better efficiency for the same security level. Eventually, we present the first attacks on the protocol RSA-S2 that employs the Chinese Remainder Theorem to speed up the client's computation.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic operations are performed everywhere, from standard laptop to smart cards. The computational resources can be very limited on certain devices (like radio-frequency identification tags), and it becomes very natural, as most of the devices are online or directly connected to a powerful device (like a SIM card in a smart phone) to securely delegate some sensitive and costly operations to a device capable of carrying out cryptographic algorithms. Outsourcing cryptographic computations is a classical problem which was formalized in [1] (with protocols to outsource the computation of group exponentiation for instance).
Recently, Chevalier, Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [2] provided simple constructions for outsourcing group exponentiations in different settings (e.g. public/secret, fixed/variable bases and public/secret exponents) in groups of known prime order. They showed that their constructions are essentially optimal in terms of operations in the underlying group. Their constructions can be used in unknown order groups but it is not clear whether they are optimal in this context. In this paper, we analyze the security and the efficiency of delegation protocols for RSA exponentiations when the secret exponent is splitted using some algebraic decomposition.
Related Work
In the last 30 years, the question of how a computationally limited device may outsource group exponentiation to another, potentially malicious, but much more computationally powerful device has been a very active research topic (e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 2] ). Many solutions have been proposed and then cryptanalyzed in follow-up papers (e.g. [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 2] ).
In 2005, Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [1] proposed a formal security definition for securely outsourcing computations. They showed how to securely outsource group exponentiation to two, possibly dishonest, servers that are physically separated (and do not communicate). Their protocol achieves security as long as one of them is honest (even if the computationally limited device does not know which one). In this paper, since this separation of the two servers is actually a strong assumption, we consider delegation to a single computationally stronger server.
In [2] , Chevalier et al. proposed a taxonomy of exponentiation delegation protocols that covers all the practical situations : the group elements can be secret or public, variable or fixed, the exponents can be secret or public, and the result of the exponentiation can also be either public or secret. In this paper, we consider the main use case in the setting of RSA exponentiation: a client wants to delegate the computation of a signature given a public key (N, e), a public message (or hash value of a message) m and the secret signing exponent d. By outsourcing some exponentiations to a server, the delegation protocol outputs a (public) signature σ = m d mod N . In all the proposed protocols, the basic idea is to let the server perform the main part of the computation, without giving it enough information to reconstruct the secret exponent d. Most proposed protocols are variants of two protocols (named RSA-S1 and RSA-S2) that were proposed by Matsumoto, Kato and Imai in 1988 [3] . Both schemes use a random linear decomposition of the RSA private exponent d. The goal of the present paper is to present attacks against these protocols for RSA exponentiations.
Our Contributions
Our contributions are manyfold:
• Analysis of protocols outsourcing a single exponentiation. As a first contribution, we analyze the delegation protocols in which the client outsources a single RSA exponentiation to the server. Such schemes generically decompose the secret exponent d among one of the following three sharing schemes: additive splitting, multiplicative splitting or mixed splitting. The security of the first scheme is closely related to the well-known partial-key exposure (e.g. see [15, 16, 17, 18] ). We propose attacks for the two other paradigms that makes use of ideas proposed by Boneh and Durfee in their seminal paper on the small secret exponent cryptanalysis of RSA [19] . To counter active attacks against delegation protocols, Pfitzmann and Waidner [12] suggested to renew the decomposition of the secret key after each signature generation in Server-Aided RSA protocols. We also present improved attacks against these serveraided protocols when the adversary is allowed to observe several executions of the protocol (with independent random decomposition).
• Cryptanalysis of RSA-S1. In 2000, Merkle proposed an efficient lattice-based multi-round passive attack against RSA-S1. Merkle's attack is probabilistic and its success probability decreases rapidly if the linear decomposition of the secret exponent is limited to small dimensions. Nguyen and Shparlinski [10] proposed one year later a single-round passive attack on the RSA-S1 ServerAided protocol which recovers the factorization of the RSA modulus when a small public exponent e is used (namely e < N 1/2 ). We combine these two approaches and we propose a (heuristic) latticebased attack that works even if the public exponent is large and the linear decomposition of d is limited to small dimensions. We also propose and analyze a variant of the protocol RSA-S1 which is interesting for clients with limited memory. In this setting, the variant achieves better efficiency for the same security level.
• Cryptanalysis of RSA-S2. The protocol RSA-S2 employs the Chinese Remainder Theorem to speed up the client's computation. Castelluccia, Mykletun and Tsudik [7] revisited in 2006 the RSA-S2 protocol to propose a technique for re-balancing RSA-based client/server handshakes. They mentioned a meet-in-the-middle attack against RSA-S1 but claimed that " this attack . . . does not apply to the RSA-S2 protocol ". They proposed several security parameters for RSA-S2. We propose a simple exponential-time algorithm that break all these security parameters using multi-evaluation of polynomials. In [10] , Nguyen and Shparlinski stated in their paper that: "Interestingly, it seems that the lattice-based attacks . . . do not apply to the RSA-S2 protocol." We also present two latticebased attacks against RSA-S2 that break most parameters proposed by Castelluccia et al. (even if one updates them in order to prevent our meet-inthe-middle attack).
The efficiency of our (heuristic) attacks has been validated experimentally.
PRELIMINARIES

Lattices
A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of a Euclidean space. If L is a lattice in the n-dimensional space R n , then we can also define L as the set of all linear integer combinations of linearly independent vectors b 1 , . . . , b k ∈ R n and:
The set B = {b 1 , . . . , b k } is called a basis of the lattice L and the integer k its dimension or rank. A lattice L ⊂ R n has full rank if its dimension equals n. If
n is a basis of a lattice L, then B can be represented by the matrix M with k rows and n columns having the basis vectors as rows and its determinant denoted det(L) is defined to be det(M M T ) 1/2 , where M T is the transpose matrix of M . If L is full rank, then its determinant is simply | det(M )|. The following lemma [20] relates the norm of the shortest vector in a lattice to its determinant. 
In the following, we use the so-called Gaussian heuristic to estimate a condition on a constructed lattice L under if the norm of a specific vector is smaller than the bound given by Lemma 2.1, then it is the shortest vector in L. In 1982, Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász introduced the famous LLL algorithm [21] which on input an arbitrary basis of a lattice L outputs in polynomial time a so-called reduced basis of L made of "short" vectors. The basis vectors of an LLL-reduced basis satisfies the following property.
In polynomial time, the LLL algorithm given as input of basis of L outputs a reduced basis of L formed by vectors v i , 1 i ω that satisfy:
Coppersmith's Methods
In this section, we provide a short description of the classical Coppersmith method [22, 23] for finding small roots of a multivariate modular polynomial system of equations modulo an integer K. We refer the reader to [24] for details and proofs.
Problem definition.
Let f 1 (y 1 , . . . , y n ), . . . , f s (y 1 , . . . , y n ) be irreducible multivariate polynomials defined over Z, having a root (x 1 , . . . , x n ) modulo an integer K namely f i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≡ 0 mod K. Our goal is to recover the desired root (x 1 , . . . , x n ) in polynomial time.
To do so, we create n polynomials (see below) h i (y 1 , . . . , y n ), i ∈ {1, . . . , n} having as root (x 1 , . . . , x n ) over the integers.
We hope that the n created polynomials define an algebraic variety of dimension 0 in order to recover the desired root in polynomial time.
This problem is generally intractable but becomes solvable in polynomial time (under some conditions) if the absolute value of each component of the root (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is upper-bounded by some values (X 1 , . . . , X n ) that depends on K and the degree of the polynomials f 1 , . . . , f s .
Polynomials collection.
In a first step, one generates a larger collection P of polynomials {f 1 , . . . ,f r } linearly independent having (x 1 , . . . , x n ) as a root modulo K m , for some positive integer m. Usually, the technique consists in taking product of powers of the moduli K, the polynomials f i for i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and some well-chosen monomials, such asf
for some positive integers α 1, , . . . , α n, , k 1, , k s, . Such polynomials satisfy the relationf (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≡ 0 mod K m .
Lattice construction.
In a second step, one denotes as M the set of monomials appearing in collection of polynomials P, and one writes the polynomialsf i (y 1 X 1 , . . . , y n X n ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , r} as a vector b i ∈ (Z) ω , where ω = M. Namely If we put M = {m 1 , . . . , m ω }, where m i < m i+1 for a defined order < on M, for i ∈ {1, . . . , r} we can writef i (y 1 X 1 , . . . , y n X n ) = ω j=1 c ij m j for some coefficients c ij ∈ Z and then b i = (c i1 , . . . , c iω ) ∈ (Z) ω . Conversely, one can write a vector v ∈ (Z) ω as a polynomialf (y 1 X 1 , . . . , y n X n ) ∈ Q[y 1 , . . . , y n ] . One then constructs a lattice L generated by the vectors b 1 , . . . , b r and computes its reduced basis using the LLL algorithm.
Generating new polynomials.
In a third step, one combines Lemma 2.3 below [25] and the Lemma 2.2 to get n polynomials g 1 (y 1 , . . . , y n ),. . . ,g n (y 1 , . . . , y n ) having (x 1 , . . . , x n ) as a root over the integers.
Lemma 2.3. (Howgrave-Graham) Let W be some positive integer. Let h(y 1 , . . . , y n ) be a polynomial over Z having at most ω monomials. Suppose that:
Then h(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 holds over the integers.
The LLL algorithm run on the lattice L to obtain n reduced vectors v i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that we see as some polynomialsh i (y 1 X 1 , . . . , y n X n ), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. One can see that for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},h i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 mod K m , sinceh i is a linear combination off 1 , . . . ,f r . Then if the following condition holds: 2 r(r−1)
by Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3,h i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} holds over the integers and we then obtain n polynomials having (x 1 , . . . , x n ) as a root over the integers.
Success Condition.
In our attacks, the number of polynomials in the first step is equal to the number of monomials that appears in the collection, so r = ω = M. In the analysis, we let (as usual in this setting) small terms contribute to an error term ε, and the simplified condition becomes:
We have no assurance that the n created polynomials are algebraically independent. Under the (heuristic) assumption that they define an algebraic variety of dimension 0, the previous system can be solved (e.g., using elimination techniques such as Gröbner basis) and the desired root recovered in polynomial time. In this paper, we assume that these polynomials define an algebraic variety of dimension 0 and we justify the validity of our attacks by computer experiments even when the dimension is non-zero.
Multi-exponentiation
Algorithm 1 computes the multi-exponentiation
. . , g t ∈ G and x 1 , . . . , x t ∈ N (see [26, 27] for details of different multi-exponentiation techniques).
Algorithm 1 Multi-Exponentiation Algorithm
Require: g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ G, x 1 , . . . , x t ∈ N with = max i∈{1,...,t} log x i and
i=0 e i,j 2 i ∈ N and e i,j ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {0, . . . , − 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , t} Ensure:
Complexity: The precomputed table contains 2 t − t − 1 non-trivial entries that require one general multiplication each.
The total cost is for the precomputation phase 2 t − t − 1 multiplications and (2 t − 1)/2 t multiplications on average and squarings. Although many time/memory tradeoffs are possible (e.g. using windows), for efficiency analysis, we consider in the following only delegation protocols that use this algorithm for client exponentiation.
DELEGATION OF A SINGLE MODULAR EXPONENTIATION
We focus in this section on protocols for outsourcing modular exponentiation (in groups of secret order) in which the client outsources only one exponentiation to the server. More precisely, we consider the setting where the client's public key is an RSA modulus N = pq where p and q are primes which are "balanced" (i.e. p and q are the same bit-size and p, q N 1/2 ) together with a public exponent e such that e N α for some α 0. In the rest of the paper, p and q have approximately the same sizes and p, q N 1/2 simply means that p and q are the same bit-size. Most standard implementations of RSA use very small public exponent such as e ∈ {3, 5, 17, 257, 65537} and the case α 0 is of very strong practical importance. The client's secret key is defined by d = e −1 mod ϕ(N ) where ϕ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler totient function.
The client has to compute c = m d mod N for some variable m ∈ Z * N (which is assumed to be public) and it is allowed to query the server on a single triple (m, r, N ) to get c = m r mod N . Using its knowledge of d and c , the client eventually outputs c. Using only the multiplicative structure of Z N , the client can compute c in essentially three different ways:
• c = m d1 · c mod N , which corresponds to an additive splitting of the secret key as
d1 mod N , which corresponds to a multiplicative splitting of the secret key as
which corresponds to a mixed splitting of the secret key as
In order to be computationally efficient for the client, these protocols should use small d 1 and d 2 . However, it is worth noting that the value r can be picked arbitrarily (and in particular it may be larger than ϕ(N )). We present attacks on these three protocols when d 1 and d 2 are too small.
Server-Aided Protocol with Additive Splitting
In the server-aided protocol with additive splitting (see Fig. 1 ), the secret d is decomposed as
is known where k is some unknown integer with k N β1 .
The adversary knows r N β that is an approximation of d N β and d 1 has to be found. This problem is actually very close to the so-called partial key exposure attacks which have been widely studied (e.g. see for instance [15, 16, 17, 18, 28, 29] ). We can simply apply the following result due to Joye and Lepoint [15] which is the best known attack for the partial key exposure with exponent blinding: Theorem 3.1 (Joye-Lepoint) . Let N = pq be a product of two primes, e N α be an integer, 
δ , we obtain readily the following result (see also Figure 2 ):
There exists a (heuristic) polynomial-time passive adversary against the serveraided protocol with additive splitting that can recover the client secret d (for sufficiently large RSA modulus) provided that:
for 1/2 < α + β 1 < 1
Server-Aided Protocol with Multiplicative Splitting
In the server-aided protocol with multiplicative splitting (see Fig. 3 ), the secret d is decomposed as
where d 1 N δ is kept secret by the client and
The goal of the adversary is to recover d 1 . There exists k N α+β1+δ such that:
In the following, we present two lattice-based attacks using this equation for the two setting when the public exponent e is "small" (i.e. α < 1) or arbitrary.
3.2.1.
Case where e is "small" (α < 1)
We put e = er N 1+α+β1 and we have:
The polynomial f (x, y) = 1+x(N +y) has as root X 0 = (k , 1 − p − q) modulo e , with |k | X = N α+β1+δ and |1−p−q| Y with Y N 1/2 (for large N ). We use the linearization u = xy + 1 as in the attack on RSA with small secret exponent proposed by Boneh and Durfee [19] and simplified by Herrmann and May [30] . We thus obtain the linear polynomialf (u, x) = u + N x. We use the same collection of polynomials as in [30] :
1 (for some parameter τ to be optimized) having as root
. Thus we define a lattice L generated the coefficient vector of each polynomialf ( Xx, Y y, U u), forf in the collection of polynomials P. One can put an appropriate order on the set P (see [30] ) for details and obtain a lower triangular matrix with the diagonal elements
(for i, j 0 and i + j m) and
The lattice L is of dimension
and has determinant 
For large m, we can find all the solutions of the modular equation f (x, y) = 0 mod e if the following condition holds:
To maximize δ, we choose τ max = 1 − 2δ and obtain the inequality 2δ 2 − 4δ + 1 − α − β 1 > 0 and the following result:
There exists a (heuristic) polynomialtime passive adversary against the server-aided protocol with multiplicative splitting that can recover the client secret d (for sufficiently large RSA modulus) provided that:
Remark 1. We do not have a passive attack against the protocol with multiplicative splitting if α + β 1 > 1 (in particular if e is of the same size as N ).
Case where e is arbitrary.
In order to attack the protocol for arbitrary public exponent e, we have to consider a stronger attack scenario. As mentioned in the introduction, it has been suggested several times to renew the decomposition of the secret exponent for each invocation of the protocol. In this paragraph, we present an attack against the server-aided protocol with multiplicative splitting when the adversary is allowed to observe k 2 different executions of the protocol (with independent random values).
We thus suppose that d is decomposed k times as
. . , k}, we have:
thus for j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, there exists k j N β1+δ such that:
Then for j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we obtain a polyno-
and ω = 2k − 1 and we define the ω-dimensional lattice L spanned by the rows of the following matrix:
The right-hand side is formed by all vectors coming from the set of polynomials {f 2 , . with the Euclidean norm v = O( √ ωU K). If we can find the vector v, then we will be able to recover the unknowns d j for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. By Lemma 2.1 and the Gaussian heuristic, the vector v is likely to be the shortest vector in the lattice L if the following condition holds:
which is equivalent to
Therefore, we can heuristically recover
There exists a (heuristic) polynomialtime passive adversary against the server-aided protocol with multiplicative splitting that can recover the client secret d (for sufficiently large RSA modulus) after eavesdropping k 2 different executions of the protocol provided that:
The results from Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 are illustrated on Figure 4 (where the red zones indicate the values δ for which the protocol with multiplicative splitting is insecure).
Server-Aided Protocol with Mixed Splitting
In the server-aided protocol with mixed splitting (see Fig. 5 ), the secret d is decomposed as
where
are kept secret unknown and
is known where k is some unknown integer with k N β1 . The goal of the adversary is to recover d 1 and d 2 . There exists k N α+β1+δ2 such that:
3.3.1. Case where e is "small" (α < 1) We put e = e · r N 1+α+β1 and we have:
We consider the following collection of polynomials:
With t = τ m (for some parameter τ to be optimized).
If we proceed as in the previous section (by putting an appropriate order an the set of monomials and the set of polynomials), we obtain a lattice L of dimension
and det(L) = X sx Y sy Z sz (e ) s e , where: 
We can thus find all the solutions of the modular equation
To maximize δ 1 and δ 2 , we choose τ max = 1−2(δ1+δ2) 3
and obtain the inequality
Theorem 3.4. There exists a (heuristic) polynomialtime passive adversary against the server-aided protocol with mixed splitting that can recover the client secret d (for sufficiently large RSA modulus) provided that:
Furthermore if δ 1 = δ 2 = δ, we obtain the following corollary:
There exists a (heuristic) polynomial-time passive adversary against the serveraided protocol with mixed splitting (with δ 1 = δ 2 = δ) that can recover the client secret d (for sufficiently large RSA modulus) provided that:
Remark 2. Theorem 3.4 can be slightly improved by following the technique of [31] for attacking the dual RSA (see Appendix 8 for details). If δ 1 = δ 2 = δ, we show that there exists a (heuristic) polynomial-time passive adversary that can recover the client secret d (for sufficiently large RSA modulus) provided that: δ < (6 − 15 + 24(α + β 1 ))/12. and the experimental bound δ exp . The size of the manipulated integers grows with β 1 . After the Gröbner basis computations, we obtained a system of polynomials of dimension 1 but were always able to find the desired root (by factoring the first polynomial of the Gröbner with gives p + q − 1 and thus N 's factorization). We run 2 7 experiments for each choice of parameters and Table 1 gives the average running times (in seconds) of the LLL algorithm and the Gröbner basis computation.
Experimental Results
We have implemented the attack in Sage 7.6 on a MacBook Air laptop computer (2,2 GHz Intel Core i7, 4 Gb RAM 1600 MHz DDR3, Mac OSX 10.10.5) for a 2048-bit modulus N and for e = 3 (α 0). We ran experiments for several values of β 1 , namely β
3.3.3.
Case where e is arbitrary. In order to attack the protocol for arbitrary public exponent e, we consider again the stronger attack scenario where the adversary is allowed to observe k 2 different executions of the protocol (with independent random values). We suppose that d is decomposed k times as d = d
N δ2 unknown for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and
where k i N β1 is unknown. For i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we have:
thus for i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, there exists k i N β1+δ2 such that:
Then using the same technique as for e arbitrary in the multiplicative splitting, we can recover (d
2 ) as long as: that is:
Theorem 3.5. There exists a (heuristic) polynomialtime passive adversary against the server-aided protocol with mixed splitting that can recover the client secret d (for sufficiently large RSA modulus) after eavesdropping k 2 different executions of the protocol provided that:
There exists a (heuristic) polynomial-time passive adversary against the serveraided protocol with mixed splitting (with δ 1 = δ 2 = δ) that can recover the client secret d (for sufficiently large RSA modulus) after eavesdropping k 2 different executions of the protocol provided that:
Our results are illustrated on Figure 6 (where the red zones indicate the values δ for which the protocol with multiplicative splitting is insecure).
CRYPTANALYSIS OF RSA-S1 PROTO-COL
Description of a RSA-S1
In 1988, Matsumoto, Kato and Imai [3] proposed the following protocol, known as RSA-S1, in which a client computes an RSA exponentiation with secret exponent (e.g. a signature), with the help of an untrusted powerful server. In the following, we assume that the server is honest-but-curious (i.e. we consider only passive adversaries).
• Step 1. The client picks uniformly at random n 1 "small" integers d i ∈ Z, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with d i ∈ {0, . . . , U } for some integer U .
• Step 2. The client picks uniformly at random n elements r i ∈ Z N , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} from the set of vectors satisfying the congruence:
• Step 3. The client sends the (n + 2)-tuple (m, r 1 , . . . , r n , N ) to the server. • Step 4. The server computes and sends to the client z i = m ri mod N , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Remark 3. Depending on the memory capacity of the client, the final exponentiation performed by the client in Step 5.
may be done by multivariate exponentiation with multiplication complexity 2 · log 2 (U ) + 2 n + O(1) and memory complexity 2 n or by independent single exponentiation with multiplication complexity 2 · n · log 2 (U ) + n + O(1) and memory complexity n. Obviously, many tradeoffs are possible, but we consider only these two settings in the following for efficiency comparison.
Previous Cryptanalysis of RSA-S1.
In this section, we briefly recall the two main attacks known on the RSA-S1 Protocol (more details are given in [10] ).
Meet-in-the-Middle Attack.
Since m e(d1r1+···dnrn) = m ed = m mod N for all m ∈ Z * N , a meet-in-the-middle attack against RSA-S1 consists, assuming for simplicity n even, in computing and storing in a hash table m e(d1r1+···d n/2 r n/2 ) mod N for all (d 1 , . . . , d n/2 ) ∈ {0, . . . , U } n/2 and searching
for (d n/2+1 , . . . , d n ) ∈ {0, . . . , U } n/2 in this hash table. This simple approach allows to recover the secret exponent d in time complexity O(U n/2 ) and memory complexity O(U n/2 ).
Lattice-based Attack.
Nguyen and Shparlinski [10] proposed a lattice-based attack on the (one-round) RSA-S1 protocol when a small public exponent e N α is used, for some α 0. They showed that one can recover the secret d as long as the sizes of each unknown d i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies:
In particular, their attack can be successful only for α < 1/2.
New Attack against RSA-S1 for Large e
In this section we propose a k-rounds lattice attack (with k 2) on the RSA-S1 Server-Aided protocol which works for any public exponent e.
When the RSA-S1 Server-Aided protocol is performed in k-rounds, the passive adversary knows k decompositions of the secret d (namely, we
i mod (p−1)(q−1), for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} where the integers r i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We suppose that e N α , r (j) i N and that p and q have the same size (p, q N 1 2 ). Then for j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we have:
for some integer k j U . Then for j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we obtain a polynomial f j (z 1,1 , . . . , z 1,n , . . . , z k,1 , . . . , z k,n , z 2 , . . . , z k ) having as root
modulo N with:
We put f j = f j − z j for j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, K = N 1/2
and ω = nk + k − 1,
. . , z 1,n , . . . , z k,1 , . . . , z k,n } = {m 1 , . . . , m ω1 } with ω 1 = M 1 = nk and m 1 = z 1,1 , . . . , m n = z 1,n , . . . , m ω1 = z k,n . Each polynomial f j can be expressed as a vector with respect to the order < on M 1 (with m i < m i+1 ). We define the ω-dimensional lattice L spanned by the rows of the following matrix:
The right-hand side is formed by all vectors coming from the set of polynomials {f 2 , . . . ,
n , . . . , Kd
with the Euclidean norm v = O( √ ωU K). If we can find find the vector v, then we will be able to recover the unknowns d (j) i for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 2.1 and the Gaussian heuristic, the vector v is likely to be the shortest vector in the lattice L if the following condition holds:
which is equivalent to U N k−1 2(nk+k−1) . Therefore, we can recover the secret d as long as the sizes of each unknown d (j) i for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies:
Experimental Results
The table below lists the theoretical bound δ theo = k−1 2(nk+k−1) (U < N δ ) and the experimental bound δ exp for a 2048-bit modulus N and for e N 1/2 with a few number of rounds (2 k 4) and a few number of unknown blocks in each decomposition of the secret d (n ∈ {2, 3}). We run 2 7 experiments for each choice of parameters and Table 2 gives the average running times (in seconds) of the LLL algorithm (using the same configuration as above). 
ANALYSIS OF A VARIANT OF RSA-S1 SERVER-AIDED PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe and analyze a variant of the server-aided protocol RSA-S1 which might be useful in cases where the client has strong memory constraints and cannot use multi-exponentiation techniques. In this setting, the final exponentiation in the protocol RSA-S1 is simply done by performing independently n multiplications with exponents of size U .
Description of a New Server-Aided Protocol
Our variant of the RSA-S1 protocol works as follows:
• Step 3. The client sends the (n + 2)-tuple (m, r 1 , . . . , r n , N ) to the server.
• Step 4. The server computes and sends to the client z i = m ri mod N , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
• Step 5.. The client computes
which is equal to m d mod N .
In this protocol, the final operation performed by the client is inherently sequential and it is not possible to use multi-exponentiation techniques. The linear random decomposition is replaces by a degree n multi-variate polynomial, one can evaluate using n multiplications using Horner rule. The client final operation consists therefore in n independent single exponentiation (that cannot be parallelized) with multiplication complexity 2 · n · log 2 (U ) + n + O(1) and memory complexity n. Its efficiency for fixed U is similar to the one of the protocol RSA-S1 but we will see that this protocol (we call RSA-S1H) seems more resistant to cryptanalysis. It is worth noting that a meet-in-the-middle attack against RSA-S1H can be mounted even if the group order is unknown to the adversary (see [32] for instance). It allows to recover the secret exponent d in time complexity O(U n/2 ) and memory complexity O(U n/2 ).
A One-Round Attack on RSA-S1H ServerAided Protocol
In this section, we propose a one-round passive attack on RSA-S1H protocol when a small public exponent e is used (for instance e = 3).
Description of the Attack
The secret d is decomposed once as
, where the integers r 1 , . . . , r n N are known and the integers d i U , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are kept secret by the client. We suppose that e N α with 0 < α < 1/2 very small and that p and q have the same size (p, q N 1 2 ) . In order to recover the secret d, the goal is to recover the integers d i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We have
then there exists an integer k eU n such that:
Thus we obtain a linear polynomial f (x 1 , . . . , x n+1 ) having as root
modulo N with :
, . . . , n} and d n+1 = 1), one can easily verify that f has as root
modulo N . We define the n + 1-dimensional lattice L spanned by the rows of the following matrix:
We have det(L) = N e n K n and the lattice L contains the vector
with the Euclidean norm v = O( √ n + 1U n K). If we can find find the vector v, then we will be able to recover the unknowns d i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 2.1 and the Gaussian heuristic, the vector v is likely to be the shortest vector in the lattice L if the following condition holds:
which is equivalent to U N 1−2α 2n(n+1) . Therefore, we can recover the secret d as long as the sizes of each unknown d i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies:
If e is very small (namely α 0), we can thus heuristically recover the secret d as long as the sizes of each unknown d i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies:
Furthermore, from θ = −k(p + q − 1) + 1, and the d i 's for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, one may compute k as k = Table 3 gives for a 2048-bit and a 3072-bit RSA modulus and for a very small public exponent e (α 0), the theoretical lower bound n theo = b 2(n+1) (resp. n theo = b 2n(n+1) ) on the number of bits of each secret d i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in the decomposition of the secret d in the RSA-S1 protocol with linear polynomial (resp. RSA-S1H) to prevent our lattice-based attacks (for n 10).
Efficiency comparisons.
To prevent meet-in-the-middle attacks, it is necessary to use parameters U and n such that U n/2 2 κ where κ is the security parameter. For instance, to achieve 128-bits security with log 2 (N ) = 3072, one can use for n = 4 a value U 2 76 = 2 max(76,256/4) for RSA-S1H (instead of U 2 256 for RSA-S1) and for n = 10 a value U 2 25.6 = 2 max(13,256/10) for RSA-S1H (instead of U 2 139 for RSA-S1).
Experimental Results.
The table below lists the theoretical bound δ theo = 1 2n(n+1) (U < N δ ) and the experimental bound δ exp for a 1024-bit modulus N and for e = 3 a few number of unknown blocks in each decomposition of the secret d (n ∈ {2, 3, 4}). We run 2 7 experiments for each choice of parameters and Table 4 gives the average running times (in seconds) of the LLL algorithm (using the same configuration as above).
A k-Round
Attack on RSA-S1H ServerAided Protocol
In this section, we propose a k-round attack on RSA-S1H protocol which works for any public exponent e.
Description of the Attack
The secret d is decomposed k 2 times as d = r
n mod (p − 1)(q − 1) for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where the integers r U , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are kept secret by the client. For j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we put P j (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = n i=1 r (j) i i t=1 x t and we suppose that e N α with 0 < α. In order to recover the secret d, the goal is to recover the integers d (j) i , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we have
U n such that:
1 , . . . , d
(1)
For each j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we thus obtain a linear multi-
having as root the (nk + k − 1)-tuple
modulo N with s = p + q − 1 and :
one can easily verify that g j has as root
and ω = nk + k − 1, M 1 = {z 1,1 , . . . , z 1,n , . . . , z k,1 , . . . , z k,n } = {m 1 , . . . , m ω1 } with ω 1 = M 1 = nk and m 1 = z 1,1 , . . . , m n = z 1,n , . . . , m ω1 = z k,n . Each polynomial f j can be expressed as a vector with respect to the order < on M 1 (with m i < m i+1 ). Then we define the ω-dimensional lattice L spanned by the rows of the following matrix: )   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  RSA-S1  2048  512  341  256  204  170  146  128  113  102  93  RSA-S1H  2048  512  170  85  51  34  24  18  14  11  9  RSA-S1  3072  768  512  384  307  256  219  192  170  153  139  RSA-S1H  3072  768  256  128  76  51  36  27  21  17 13 The right-hand side is formed by all vectors coming from the set of polynomials {f 2 , . . . ,
with the Euclidean norm v = O( √ ωU n K). If we can find find the vector v, then we will be able to recover the unknowns d (j) i for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 2.1 and the Gaussian heuristic, the vector v is likely to be the shortest vector in the lattice L if the following condition holds:
Therefore, we can recover the secret d as long as the sizes of each unknown d (j) i for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies:
6. CRYPTANALYSIS OF RSA-S2 PROTO-COL
Description of RSA-S2
Matsumoto, Kato and Imai [3] also proposed another protocol, known as RSA-S2 which employs the Chinese Remainder Theorem to speed up the client's computation.
•
Step 0. The client computes integers d p < p and
• Step 1. The client picks uniformly at random n 1 pairs of "small" integers (
• Step 2. The client picks uniformly at random n elements r i ∈ {0, . . . , V } (for some integer V ), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} from the set of vectors satisfying the congruence:
and uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to recover 3 σ = m d mod N satisfying σ p = m dp mod p and σ q = m dq mod q.
Time/Memory Tradeoof Attack using Multi-Evaluation of Polynomials
Let P (x) ∈ Z N [x] be a polynomial of degree less than ∆ = 2 d . The multipoint evaluation problem is the task of evaluating P at ∆ distinct points α 0 , . . . , α ∆−1 ∈ Z N . Using Horner's evaluation rule, it is easy to propose a solution that uses O(∆ 2 ) addition and multiplication in Z N but it is well-known that there exists an algorithm with quasi-linear complexity O(∆ log 2 ∆) =Õ(∆) operations in Z N using a divide-and-conquer approach [33, 34] .
The multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials has found numerous application in cryptanalysis (e.g. [35, 36] ). In this paragraph, we show that this technique allows to break the RSA-S2 Protocol in timeÕ(U n/2 ).
For simplicity, we assume that n is even (but the attack can readily be extended to odd n). Let m be some random element of Z * N . We have m e·dp = m mod p (since d p is the inverse of e modulo p − 1). With high probability, we have m e·dp = m mod q (for d p = d q ). Therefore, we have with overwhelming probability gcd(m e·dp − m, N ) = p. In the setting of RSA-S2, a passive adversary knows integers r 1 , . . . , r n such that
and d i U for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A naive idea to factor N is thus to compute gcd(m
In order to apply a meet-in-the-middle approach, one may be tempted to first compute m e·(d1r1+···+d n/2 r n/2 ) for all vectors (d 1 , . . . , d n/2 ) ∈ {0, . . . , U } n/2 in timeÕ(U n/2 ) and then compute m e·(d n/2+1 r n/2+1 +···+dnrn) for all vectors of integers (d n/2+1 , . . . , d n ) ∈ {0, . . . , U } n/2 in timeÕ(U n/2 ). However, in order to compute all possible gcd's, we have to consider all the pairs and the overall time complexity isÕ(U n ).
Using multi-evaluation of polynomials, one can simply consider the polynomial
The degree of P is ∆ = U n/2 and one can compute its evaluation at the ∆ points
n/2 and with high probability we will obtain one non-trivial 4 factor of N .
Remark 4. As mentioned above, Castelluccia, Mykletun and Tsudik [7] revisited in 2006 the RSA-S2 protocol. They proposed several security parameters for RSA moduli of bit-size 1024, 1536 and 2048. For these parameters the time and memory complexity term U n/2 of our attack are only equal to 2 36 , 2 40 and 2 44 (respectively) and these parameters are therefore broken.
A One-Round Attack using HerrmannMay Technique
In this section, we propose a one-round attack on RSA-S2 protocol using May technique that is a Coppermith's technique to find small solutions of a linear polynomial 4 If one of this gcd's is actually equal to N for some (d n/2+1 , . . . , dn) ∈ {0, . . . , U } n/2 and one can obtain a prime divisor of N by looking (in timeÕ(U n/2 )) for the vector (d 1 , . . . , d n/2 ) ∈ {0, . . . , U } n/2 for which gcd(m e· (d 1 r 1 +···+dnrn) − m, N ) is non-trivial.
modulo an unknown prime number, where a multiple of that prime is known. In our attack, we suppose that a small public exponent e is used and that small random elements r i 's are used (V < p).
Description of the Attack
, where the integers r 1 , . . . , r n p are known and the integers d i , d i U = N γ , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are kept secret by the client. We suppose that e N α with α 0 and that p and q have the same size (p, q N 1 2 ) . The goal is to recover the integers d i , d i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In the following, we show how to recover the integers d i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the same technique can be used to recover the others integers d i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We have
. Thus we have:
where the prime p is unknown, we only know the modulus N which is a multiple of p. We obtain a linear polynomial f (x 1 , . . . , x n+1 ) having as root X = (d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n , k) modulo p with :
We use the following theorem proved by Herrmann and May in [37] to find the root
Theorem 6.1. Let ε > 0 and let N = pq be a sufficiently large composite integer with a divisor p N β . Let g(x 1 , . . . , x ) ∈ Z[x 1 , . . . , x ] be a monic polynomial in variables. We can find heuristically all solutions (y 1 , . . . , y ) of the equation f (x 1 , . . . , x ) = 0 mod p with
The time and space complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in log 2 N and ( 
Therefore, if N sufficiently large and e is very small (namely α 0), for a very small ε > 0 we can heuristically recover the secret d i , d i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} as long as the sizes of each unknown d i , d i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies:
.
Remark 5.
• We can find the roots in polynomial time whenever n + 1 O(log 2 (log 2 N )).
• In the proof of Theorem 6.1, Herrmann and May used Coppermith's method with the following collection of polynomials which share a common root modulo p t :
where i 2 , . . . , i ∈ {0, . . . , m} such that
• The previous theorem can not be outperformed by the results of [38] since the bounds of the unknowns d i , d i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are identical. The table below (U < N δ theo ) and the experimental bound δ exp for a 1024-bit modulus N = pq and p, q N 1/2 , for e = 3 and with a few number of unknown blocks in each decomposition of the secrets d p and d q (n 5). In our experiments, we obtained after the LLL reduction and the Gröbner basis computations, a system of polynomials of dimension 1 but were always able to find the desired root. We run 2 4 experiments for each choice of parameters and Table 5 gives the average running times (in seconds) of the LLL algorithm and the Gröbner basis computation (using the same configuration as above).
Experimental Results
Remark 6. Castelluccia et al. proposed parameters in [7] for n = 2. Even if one doubles the bit-size of the proposed U in order to prevent the meet-in-the-middle attack from the previous section, we obtain for RSA moduli of bit-size 1024, 1536 and 2048, U equal to 2 72 , 2 80 and 2 88 , i.e. U N 0.070 , U N 0.052 an U N 0.044 (respectively). Our attack works for U N 0.0635 and the last two (updated) parameters are therefore broken in practice.
A Two-Round Attack using HerrmannMay technique
In this section, we give a description of a TwoRound attack on RSA-S2 protocol using HerrmannMay technique when an arbitrary public exponent e is used. The secrets d p and d q are decomposed twice as d p = r 
EFFICIENCY OF SERVER-AIDED RSA PROTOCOLS
In this section, we compare the efficiency of the protocols studied in the previous sections. We consider 3072-bit RSA moduli and different values for n ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8}. Since our two families of attacks (for small and arbitrary public exponents), succeed asymptotically (when k goes to ∞) for the same bound U , we do not distinguish them in the comparison. For RSA-S1 and RSA-S2, we distinguish two settings depending on whether the client has enough memory to perform multi-exponentiation in Step 5. of these two protocols. 
